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POPULAR RESPONSES TO MAMLUK FISCAL REFORMS IN SYRIA
Bethany J. WALKER
Department of History, Missouri State University
The decline of the Mamluk state – its character, timing and evolution, and the catalysts 
behind it – has been one of the most debated topics in Mamluk studies. Sparked by the 
publication of Amalia Levanoni’s monograph on Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad in 1995, 
scholarship on the issue has largely focused on identifying when and under what conditions 
the Mamluk “machine” began to fail politically, militarily, and economically.1 The changes 
in Egyptian and Syrian society that followed in its wake have only begun to be explored, 
as Mamluk “decline” has been in recent years reinterpreted in terms of social and political 
“transformations”.2 On the level of the economy, the parameters of debate have shifted to 
state responses to crises, speciﬁcally policy changes aimed at redeeming the Treasury and 
staving oﬀ bankruptcy. Such is a revisionist understanding of the late Mamluk period that 
deﬁnes economic action, in part, as rational response to economic necessity. An earlier 
emphasis on exploitative attempts to line individual pockets or replenish the Treasury 
(through conﬁscation, hoarding, and devaluation of currency) is being gradually replaced 
with an appreciation of more long-term initiatives that would accomplish the same, such as 
the creation of new ﬁnancial bureaus and structures for developing private property. Thus, 
greed may have been less a motivator for some of the ﬁnancial practices of the ﬁfteenth 
century than economic imperatives. While current scholarship far from suggests that the 
elite of the Mamluk state, as a whole, governed with wisdom in the economic sphere, it is 
illustrating ways in which individual actors did attempt meaningful reforms with an eye to 
ﬁnancial recovery and long-term stability.
What has been missing from these debates to this point, however, has been a 
consideration of how the non-elite responded to these initiatives and how they perceived 
the changes that resulted from them in their own societies. This essay explores one economic 
practice actively discussed, and criticized, by contemporaries: the purchase of Treasury 
1. A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun (1310-1341) (Leiden, 1995).
2.  To cite one example of such exchanges, a panel devoted to the topic at the annual International Conference on 
Medieval Studies in Kalamazoo, Michigan in May, 2005 was published in 2007 in a special issue on Mamluk econom-
ics in Mamluk Studies Review (volume 11.1).
52 BETHANY J. WALKER
(Bayt al-Mal) assets and their subsequent endowment (waqf). As one of the most important 
economic developments of the late Middle Ages in the Islamic world, the alienation of 
public lands and their transformation into private property is an important turning 
point in medieval Islamic ﬁnancial history. Similarly, the legal mechanisms that emerged, 
legitimizing both practices, mark an important development in Hanaﬁ thought and are 
recognized as a watershed in the larger history of Islamic jurisprudence. Such practices 
had not only economic and legal repercussions; they had the potential to transform the 
agricultural regime, and local society in a more general sense, as land proprietorship and 
management were the ties that bound both the countryside and urban centers to the 
state.
The following oﬀers some reﬂections on popular responses to the alienation of 
Treasury assets in the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries, by examining the political action 
by peasants, the critiques of local intellectuals, and the formal opinions of lawyers.3 The 
study makes special reference to Jordan in this period, as the building of sultanic landed 
estates from former state lands appear to have been ﬁrst applied on a large scale in the 
Transjordan.4 Jordan thus becomes a barometer of the success or failure of one aspect 
of the Mamluks’ ﬁscal reforms and oﬀers a window on the ways in which they played 
out on the local level. In order to describe the background of the reforms, we begin with 
contemporary critiques of the economy.
CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL REFORMS
Contemporaries were well aware of the ﬁnancial problems of the day and were quick 
to blame an ineﬀective, corrupt, and apathetic government for ineխcient, or non-existent, 
responses to rising prices and food shortages. Perhaps the most vocal critic of the Mamluk 
state’s ﬁscal policies was the Egyptian historian Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd al-
Qadir ibn Muhammad al-Maqrizi. He completed his treatise on famine (Ighathat al-ummah 
bi-kashf al-ghummah) in 1405, at the end of his third term as Inspector of the Markets in 
Cairo. In this work he captures the realities of life for most Cairenes at the turn of the 
ﬁfteenth century: people were going hungry, and food, though available, was not being 
distributed. He points to several practices, with which he was intimately familiar, that 
created scarcities of foodstuﬀs and exacerbated their eﬀect: inﬂated prices and forced 
purchases (tarh) by oխcials, bribery (particularly damaging when ﬁnancial oխces are 
purchased in this manner), high taxes, and an unstable and inﬂated currency.5 Although 
he recognizes that several seasons of draught caused initial food shortages, he blames 
the state for not appropriately responding to the agricultural crisis that ensued and for 
corruption and poor ﬁnancial practices that made it much worse.
3.  This article pulls from ideas more fully developed in Chapter Four in my forthcoming monograph Jordan in the 
Late Middle Ages: Transformation of the Mamluk Frontier.
4.  Mamluk “Jordan” consisted of the Province (Mamlakat) of Kerak and the southernmost district of the Province 
of Damascus.
5. Adel Allouche, Mamluk Economics: A Study and Translation of al-Maqrizi’s Ighathah (Salt Lake City, 1994, 50-54. al-
Maqrizi wrote a second book, devoted entirely to currency devaluation: Shudhur al-‘uqud ﬁ dhikr al-nuqud.
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A much lesser known source, Muhammad ibn Khalil al-Asadi, responds in a similar tone 
about the economic functions of the state in his treatise on administrative and ﬁnancial 
reform (al-Taysir wa al-i‘tibar wa al-tahrir wa al-ikhtibar ﬁ-ma yajibu min husn al-tadbir wa al-
tasarruf wa al-ikhtiyar), written around 854/1450.6 While he devotes the largest part of this 
work to inﬂation and monopolies, he makes several suggestions for economic revival that 
require decisive action by the government. For him, it is the responsibility of the state to 
control the value of currency, guarantee unrestricted markets, and ensure the availability 
of basic foodstuﬀs. His perspective, which betrays a background in the Syrian ﬁnancial 
administration, is comparable to that of al-Maqrizi in its identiﬁcation of manipulation of 
currency, corruption and tyranny of oխcials, the imposition of illegal and high taxes, and 
neglect of agricultural lands as the factors behind the poor economic conditions of the 
state in his day.7   
Though valid, the critiques of al-Maqrizi and al-Asadi are more concerned with the 
eﬀects than the causes of the economic malaise of the ﬁfteenth century. The Mamluk state 
was, in fact, at the verge of ﬁnancial collapse by the end of the fourteenth century, a state 
of aﬀairs that Sultan Barquq immediately tried to address, ﬁrst in his oխce as atabeg and 
then as sultan (reigned 784-791/1382-1389, 792-801/1390-1399), the ﬁrst of the Burji, or so-
called “Circassian”, dynasty.8 Barquq’s sultanate has been increasingly attracting scholarly 
attention for more than merely political change, as it also coincides with attempts to revive, 
or replace, the moribund iqta‘ system.9 The iqta‘ system – which controlled most of the 
agricultural land in Egypt and Syria and organized the distribution of tax revenues from 
those lands to the military - was the backbone of the Mamluk economy and structured 
economic, political, and social relations among the state, the cities, and the countryside. 
It was no longer functioning eﬀectively by the end of the century, as the Treasury had 
been gradually drained of the landed assets on which iqta‘ grants were based.10 The leasing 
and sale of land from the Bayt al-Mal had become more common in the second half of the 
fourteenth century, following the demographic and economic turmoil of the Black Death 
6. The work has been published under this title and edited by ‘Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Tulaymat (Cairo, 1968). 
(Though long out of print, the occasional copy can be found in Cairo through the publisher, Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi.) 
There have been very few scholarly studies of the work. Some notable early ones include Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali, “al-
Taysir wa al-I‘tibar wa Tahrir al-Ikhtiyar ﬁ-ma Yajibu min Husn al-Tadbir wa al-Tasarruf wa al-Ikhtiyar”, Majallat 
Majma‘ al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyyah bi-Dimashq 3.11 (1923): 321-327 and Subhi Labib, “al-Asadi und sein Bericht über Ver-
waltungs- und Geldreform im 15. Jahrhundert”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 8 (1965): 312-316. For 
more recent analysis of the text, see John L. Meloy, “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the 
Circassian Mamluk Period”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 47 (2004): 195-212 and ibid, “Himayah”, 
Chicago On-line Encylopaedia of Mamluk Studies (accessed at http://mamluk.uchicago.edu).  
7. ‘Ali, “al-Taysir wa al-I‘tibar”, 198.
8. DAISUKE IGARASHI, “The Establishment and Development of al-Diwan al-Mufrad: Its Background and Implications”, 
Mamluk Studies Review 10.1 (2006): 121-122.
9.  The cultivation of networks of political patronage that, in part, brought Barquq to power is brieﬂy explored in 
Jo Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos: Patronage, Conﬂict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341-1382 (Leiden, 2006). 
For his administrative and economic reforms as sultan, see Igarashi, “The Establishment and Development of al-
Diwan al-Mufrad”, 117-140 and Bethany J. Walker, “Sowing the Seeds of Rural Decline? Agriculture as an Economic 
Barometer for Late Mamluk Egypt”, Mamluk Studies Review 11.1 (2007): 173-199, a discussion of which follows.
10. IBN QADI SHUHBA, Tarikh Ibn Qadi Shuba, ed. Adnan Darwish (1977) 1: 225.
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and the coming to power of a series of weak sultans. The death of grant holders (muqta‘s), 
accelerated by the plague, made numerous tax revenues (and the lands that supported 
them) available, a circumstance of which advantage could be taken in the absence of a 
strong, and watchful, central government.
Not surprisingly, iqta‘ grants, which would normally be distributed to new personnel 
upon the death of its muqta‘, and other kharaj-paying lands were being sold, at generally 
lower prices than they were worth, in order to liquidate assets and secure cash for political 
purposes.11 The land then became, for all intents and purposes, the private property of the 
purchaser, leaving the Treasury for good and no longer available for soldiers’ compensation.12 
Moreover, such land was frequently made waqf for a charitable endowment, which was tax-
free, could not be legally conﬁscated, and which normally beneﬁted the descendants of the 
donor, as trustees of the foundation. While lucrative for individuals (who were, more often 
than not, members of the Mamluk and civilian elite) and their families, the alienation of 
Treasury assets in this manner robbed the state of important revenues for defense, social 
services, and emergencies of all forms.13 State oխcials, starved of funds in this manner, 
resorted to the kinds of damaging, and illegal, practices lamented by al-Maqrizi and al-
Asadi in an eﬀort to replenish salaries and, undeniably, build personal wealth.
Igarashi’s recent studies on the ﬁscal reforms of Sultans Barquq (d. 801-1399) and 
Qaytbay (ruled 872-901/1468-1496) highlight the central role the “waqﬁzation” of 
public assets played in the ﬁnancial crises of the late fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries. 
He convincingly argues that attempts at economic recovery speciﬁcally targeted this 
phenomenon and tried to rectify it by ﬁnding ways to legalize conﬁscation of endowed 
properties and institutionally bypass long-standing bureaus that traditionally controlled 
access to state assets. To summarize Igarashi’s arguments, the depletion of the Treasury, 
and speciﬁcally the revenues from kharaj-paying lands, caused a ﬁnancial crisis at the 
outset of Barquq’s reign, by robbing the state of resources from which to pay the military, 
and particularly the Royal Mamluks. He responded by creating two new ﬁnancial bureaus 
that would be under his direct control as sultan: al-Diwan al-Mufrad (likely established 
in 1386) and Diwan al-Amlak (in 1395).14 The ﬁrst, originally ﬁnanced from his personal 
assets (his own iqta‘s), would be dedicated to the ﬁnancial support of the Royal Mamluks, 
independent of the other diwans and funded separately from the rest of the Treasury. By 
the mid-ﬁfteenth century, this bureau came to control the largest percentage of kharaj-
11.  See Van Steenbergen, Order out of Chaos, 57-75 for an assessment of the role of money in the political struggles 
of the late Bahri period.
12.  There is a growing body of scholarship on this topic. In addition to Igarashi’s work cited above (“al-Diwan 
al-Mufrad”), see Khalil ‘Ashaminah, Filistin ﬁ al-‘Ahadayn al-Ayyubi wa al-Mamluki (1187-1516) (Beirut, 2006): 357-361, 
Walker, “Sowing the Seeds”, and the work by Petry and Abu Ghazi reviewed below. ‘Ashaminah documents the 
“privatization” of state assets in a similar manner by retirees and those dismissed (turkhan and battal) from military 
service.
13.  For examples of the ways Treasury assets met emergencies in Syria, see Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Tarikh, 1:517 (in 
796 Sultan Barquq requested one-half of the village of al-Aftarisi from the Treasury in order to equip the army to 
check the advance of Timur on Syria) and 555 (in 797 wheat from the Treasury was sold to feed orphans and others 
in need). 
14. Igarashi, “al-Diwan al-Mufrad”.
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paying lands in Egypt. Syrian land also came under the authority of this bureau, although 
we cannot know for sure, in the absence of written documentation of land surveys in 
Syria (comparable to Ibn Duqmaq and Ibn Ji‘an), to what extent it was applied.15 This, 
thus, marks an important stage in the reorganization of the state’s administrative and 
economic apparatus. The success of Barquq’s initiatives in concentrating assets may be 
gauged by the settlement of his estate upon his death: in 801 a meeting of leading clerics, 
high-ranking amirs, and the Khassakiyya debated who would be entitled to his vast assets, 
agreeing that 5/6 would return to the Treasury, where they “would be spent for the beneﬁt 
of [all] Muslims” (yusarraf ﬁ maṣaliḥ al-muslimin).16
Igarashi demonstrates that al-Diwan al-Mufrad, over time, came to be something of a 
social welfare institution for the non-mamluk members of the elite: mamluks’ widows and 
sons (awlad al-nas), lawyers, and merchants.17 As a result, because expenditures outstripped 
the assets of the bureau, it was at a state of virtual bankruptcy by the reign of Qaytbay (r. 872-
901/ 1468-1496). The state’s ﬁnances were further strained by expensive military campaigns 
against the Ottomans. Sultan Qaytbay responded by using his own assets (khass and his 
endowments), as well as those of other bureaus, to sustain al-Diwan al-Mufrad and to pay 
amirs and continue pensions. Such eﬀorts were reinforced with other measures meant to 
replenish the Treasury, such as taxation of endowments, taking 1/5 of kharaj revenues from 
iqta‘s, and freezing subsidies to non-mamluks. The ultimate result was the transformation 
of the Treasury into a ﬁnancial agent of the sultan, furthering the process of centralization 
of state funds and highlighting most clearly the demise of the feudal iqta‘ system.18
The reforms of Qaytbay built on those of Barquq and had the same goal: to put money 
back into the Treasury, or at least under the centralized and direct control of independent 
bureaus controlled by the sultan, for redistribution to his own mamluks and where else most 
needed. It is ironic, however, that the practice that initially led to the crisis of the Treasury 
– the alienation of former iqta‘ lands from the Treasury and subsequent endowment for 
family or charitable foundations – was one adopted, in the end, for ﬁnancial recovery. This 
was, as well, the economic practice most debated in legal circles and which had the greatest 
potential to transform imperial-rural relations and the agricultural sector.
“WAQFICATION” OF THE TREASURY (BAYT AL-MAL)
The endowment of privately-owned, income-producing properties for public good 
(waqf) was considered an act of piety and supported, as all charities, by Shari‘a. The act 
of endowment took the property out of the public sphere: the ownership of the property 
itself (the ‘ayn) now belonged to God, its revenues were earmarked for a charitable purpose, 
15.  Al-Diwan al-Mufrad controlled, as well, lands in Syria. As early as 800 H the oխce of Hajib al-Sham was also 
responsible for the revenues of al-Diwan al-Mufrad, and two years later the deputy of the majordomo (Na’ib al-
ustadar) of Syria fulﬁlled this role (Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Tarikh 1: 657 and (1997) 4: 107). For a discussion of Ibn Duqmaq’s 
Kitab al-intisar li-wasitat ‘iqd al-amsar and Ibn Ji‘an’s Kitab al-tuhfah al-saniyah bi-asma’ al-Bilad al-Misriyah, from a Syrian 
perspective, see Walker, “Sowing the Seeds”, 178-179.
16.  IBN QADI SHUHBA, Tarikh 4: 25-26.
17.  DAISUKE IGARASHI, “al-Diwan al-Mufrad”, 132-137 – citing al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghribirdi.
18.  DAISUKE IGARASHI, “Financial Reforms of Sultan Qaytbay”, Mamluk Studies Review 13.1 (2009): 27-51.
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and it could no longer be taxed or otherwise legally touched by the state. A second form 
of endowment - family waqf - was equally legal but not as secure as a charitable one, as 
its revenues were set aside for the beneﬁt of a family and its descendants. They were 
particularly vulnerable to conﬁscation by government oխcials. Mamluk-era endowments 
fell into both categories: charitable awqaf (awqaf khayri) could be administered by the 
endower and his family (who could then enjoy a portion of the revenues as compensation), 
and formal family awqaf (awqaf dhurri or ahli) would generally ultimately beneﬁt a charitable 
cause or foundation when the family line died out. Of the former, the largest were “sultanic 
endowments”, which were either created directly from Treasury (in other words, public, 
kharaj-liable) lands, supporting institutions in the general interest (maslaha) of the Muslims, 
or indirectly through quasi-legal purchase of iqta‘at and other lands from the Treasury, 
subsequently endowed for charitable purposes (either explicitly or indirectly) through 
formal legal procedures.19 In principle, the former were legal, while the legality of the 
latter (discussed below) was intensely debated among ﬁfteenth-century jurists.20 Sultanic 
endowments ultimately served the larger good of the community, because they frequently 
funded expensive and important public services (health care, education, building of 
mosques, supplying water); they were, nonetheless, the biggest ﬁnancial liability for the 
Mamluk state. Any alienation of taxable public lands robbed the state of critical funds 
needed for defense, development, emergencies, and support for the poor.
Critical analyses of awqaf by Carl Petry and ‘Imad Abu Ghazi have brought attention to 
the ﬁnancial and political impact of the “waqﬁzation” of former public lands.21 Petry was 
the ﬁrst to identify the “privatization” of state lands as a kind of “clandestine investment” 
during the ﬁnancial crises of the late Mamluk period. 22 What resulted was both the ﬁnal 
death blow of the iqta‘ system, the socio-political-economic underpinning of the Mamluk 
state, and asset-building in the form of private property: in short, the reemergence of 
19. Such endowments in Mamluk-period sources are simply referred to as awqaf made by the ruler (imam, sultan) 
from the Bayt al-Mal, but in Ottoman sources in Syria and Egypt they came to be known as waqf irsadi (or “endowment 
of designation”), if they came directly from the Treasury (Kenneth M. Cuno, “Ideology and Juridical Discourse in 
Ottoman Egypt: The Uses of the Concept of Irsad”, Islamic Law and Society 6.2 (1999), 141).
20.  Technically the sultan, as the head of state, could not legally sell public lands to himself, although he could 
endow directly from the Treasury (according to some contemporary scholars). In order to purchase from the 
Treasury, he would assign a civilian agent (wikalat Bayt al-Mal) to act on behalf of the Treasury and to sell to him the 
land, or, in his capacity of head of the government, the sultan would personally sell from the Treasury to a third 
party, later buying the same property from him (Kenneth Cuno, “Was the Land of Ottoman Syria Miri or Milk? An 
Examination of Juridical Diﬀerences within the Hanaﬁ School”, Studia Islamica 81.1 (1995), 126, note 19). On wikalat 
Bayt al-Mal, see Yusuf Ghawanmeh, Dimashq ﬁ ‘Asr Dawlat al-Mamalik al-Thaniyah (Beirut, 2005), 94. 
21. Carl F. Petry, Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamluk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning as a Great Power (Albany, 1994): 
196-210; idem, “Fractionalized Estates in a Centralized Regime: The Holdings of al-Ashraf Qaytbay and Qansuh al-
Ghawri According to their Waqf Deeds”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 41.1 (1998): 95-117; idem, 
“Waqf as an Instrument of Investment in the Mamluk Sultanate: Security vs. Proﬁt?”, in Slave Elites in the Middle East 
and Africa: A Comparative Study, ed. Toru Miura and John Edwards Philips (New York, 2000), 99-115; and ‘Imad Badr 
al-Din Abu Ghazi, Fi Tarikh Misr al-Ijtima‘i: Tatawwur al-Hiyazah al-Zira‘iyah Zaman al-Mamalik al-Jarakisah (Dirasah ﬁ Bay‘ 
Amlak Bayt al-Mal) (Cairo, 2000).
22.  Because the endowments of Sultans Qaytbay and al-Ghawri (r. 906-922/1501-1516) produced revenues that 
exceeded expenditures by over 90%, it would appear that their primary purpose was revenue production, rather 
than support of charities (Petry, “Waqf as an Instrument”, 104). See also Petry, Protectors or Praetorians?, 210.
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private property after the collapse of the Mamluk-style feudal system. Petry estimates that 
some 30% of the Mamluk endowments registered in the waqﬁyat of the Cairo archives date 
to the reign of Sultan al-Ghawri,23 suggesting a response to economic or political pressures 
at the end of the Mamluk era. Most of these, according to the documents available, were 
acquired piecemeal, as shares of rural land or villages.24 In his quantitative analysis of 
waqﬁyat and documents of sale, purchase, and transfer in Egyptian archives, Abu Ghazi 
determines, in parallel fashion, that most of the pre-Ottoman endowments in Egypt (over 
95%) date to the Burji Mamluk period (and the majority of these during the reigns of Sultans 
Inal, Khushqadam, Qaytbay, and al-Ghawri) and that they were made from the purchase of 
iqta‘ land.25 He concludes that by the end of the Mamluk Sultanate, the Treasury was, for 
all intents and purposes, empty, a condition largely produced by the endowment of nearly 
90% of Egypt’s agricultural land.26
The history of endowments in Jordan challenges this scenario. Mamluk-era waqﬁyat in 
the Dar al-Watha’iq and Wizarat al-Awqaf in Cairo, the majority previously unidentiﬁed,27 
and sixteenth-century Ottoman tax registers (tapu defters) for Liwa’ Ajlun in Ankara, now 
published, document the endowment of entire villages in Jordan by sultans as early as the 
reign of Sha‘ban (r. 764-778/1363-1377)28 and the development of sultanic landed estates, 
through waqf, of Jordanian agricultural land from Barquq’s reign.29 They largely beneﬁted 
the madrasa complexes of the donor-sultans in Cairo. Many of these endowments were 
maintained by the Ottoman authorities (and taxed at 10%, as most local awqaf were under 
the Ottomans) incorporated, in their entirety, into the khass of the sultan or provincial 
governor. Sultanic endowments in Jordan were among the most lucrative in the region 
(sugar plantations, expansive wheat ﬁelds, well watered olive groves) and include the entire 
23.  Petry, “Waqf as an Instrument”, 105.
24.  Ibid., 103.
25. Abu Ghazi, Fi Tarikh Misr, 16-22.
26.  Ibid., 83.
27.  Preliminary studies can be found in Yousef Ghawanmeh, “al-Qarya ﬁ Junub al-Sham (al-Urdunn wa-Filistin) ﬁ 
al-‘Asr al-Mamluki ﬁ Daw’ Waqﬁyat Adar”, Studies in the History and Archaeology of Jordan 1 (1982): 363-371 and idem 
Tarikh Sharqi al-Urdunn ﬁ ‘Asr Dawlat al-Mamalik al-Ula (al-Qism al-Hadari) (Amman, 1979), 243-244; Bethany J. Walker 
“Mamluk Investment in the Transjo privately-held rdan: A ‘Boom and Bust’ Economy”, Mamluk Studies Review 8.2 
(2004): 119-147 and idem, “The Northern Jordan Survey 2003 – Agriculture in Late Islamic Malka and Hubras Vil-
lages: A Preliminary Report of the First Season”, Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 339 (2005): 67-111. 
The comprehensive analysis of these documents, in addition to other waqﬁyat, appears in Walker, Jordan in the Late 
Middle Ages.
28.  For references to portions (or shares) of Jordanian villages and agricultural lands endowed much earlier 
by Sultan al-Zahir Baybars (r. 658-676/1260-1277), see Ghawanmeh, “al-Qarya ﬁ Junub al-Sham”, 371 (one-half of 
the village of al-Tura, in northern Jordan – citing Taqi al-Din al-Subki) and Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit and Nou-
fan Raja Hmoud, al-Defter al-Mufassal li-Liwa’ ‘Ajlun, Tapu Defteri No. 185, Ankara 1005 A.H./1596 A.D. (Amman, 1991), 32 
(shares in the village of Bayt Rama, in the Jordan Valley).
29.  The relevant registers have been edited and published, in Turkish with Arabic commentary, in Muhammad 
Adnan al-Bakhit, Nahiyat Beni Kinana (Shamali al-Urdunn) ﬁ al-‘Asr al-‘Ashir al-Hijri/al-Sadis ‘Ashir al-Miladi (Amman, 
1989) and al-Bakhit and Hmoud,, Tapu Defteri 185. Brief summaries of a handful also appear in Mehmet Ipsarli and 
Muhammad Dawud al-Tamimi, Awqaf wa Amlak al-Muslimin ﬁ Filistin (Istanbul, 1982).  
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village of Adar and miscellaneous gardens (all near Kerak – by Sha‘ban in 777/1375)30; the 
villages of Nimrin, Kafrin, and Zara‘a (all in the Jordan Valley) and Malka (in the north), all 
in their entirety (by Barquq in 796/1393); the northern villages of Marw and Harhar and 
shares of several villages in the northern hill country and Jordan Valley (by Khushqadam [r. 
865-872/1461-1467], no date given); and the village of Majid, also in the north (by Qaytbay, 
no date given).31 
The extant Mamluk waqﬁyat and Ottoman tax registers that conﬁrm these endowments 
do not generally specify under what circumstances and through what legal means these 
lands were initially acquired. The waqﬁyah for Sultan Sha‘ban’s endowment of gardens, water 
facilities, and a bathhouse (hammam) in Adar does mention that the properties were “from 
the land in the government’s domain” (min al-khass al-sharif); this reference is, however, 
a rare exception.32 The availability of so many villages, in their entirety rather than mere 
shares, in Jordan in the mid-fourteenth century may be related to the demographic and 
administrative turmoil caused by the plague of the 1340s, as the sultan, and other members 
of the ruling elite, appropriated the iqta‘at of plague victims.33 Until purchase documents 
for such villages are identiﬁed in the archives, one must assume they were endowed by 
sultanic ﬁat from the Treasury or through sale from the same, transforming the land to 
milk (private property), and subsequently endowed.
Purchases of properties from the Treasury and endowments by amirs can be identiﬁed 
even earlier in Jordan.34 Amman and Hisban present a particularly interesting case for 
the former. The village of Hisban, located some twenty kilometers south of Amman on 
the Madaba Plains, served as the district capital of the Balqa during the ﬁrst half of the 
fourteenth century. It housed a small garrison of soldiers, led by an amir of ten, and had 
a prosperous market, its own court and judge (qadi), and a madrasa. In 757/1357 the amir 
Sarghatmish purchased the entire “city” (madina) of nearby Amman from the Bayt al-Mal, 
presumably for the beneﬁt of his madrasa complex in Cairo, built the same year, although 
this is not speciﬁed by Ibn Qadi Shuhba.35 He subsequently moved all important public 
services from Hisban to Amman, including the local administration, judiciary, and market, 
30. In addition to properties on the Kerak Plateau, this endowment included many whole villages in Egypt and 
Syria, including those in the region of Hama, Ma‘arat al-Nu‘man, Nablus, and Aleppo (Ghawanmeh , “al-Qarya ﬁ 
Junub al-Sham”, 367).
31. Walker, “Sowing the Seeds”, 189-190; idem, “Boom and Bust”; and Muhammad Adnan al-Bakhit, “Awqaf During 
the Late Mamluk Period and Early Ottoman Times in Palestine and Jordan”, in Urbanism and Islam, ed. Editorial Com-
mittee of the Research Project “Urbanism in Islam, a Comparative Study” (Tokyo, 1994), 188. 
32. Waqﬁyah 8/49, Dar al-Watha’iq, Cairo – transcribed in Ghawanmeh, Tarikh Sharqi al-Urdunn, 243.
33.The rural properties endowed for Sultan al-Nasir Hasan’s madrasa complex (work begun in 758/1357) in 
Rumayla, near the Cairo Citadel, were likely acquired under these circumstances (Howayda N. al-Harithy, “The 
Complex of Sultan in Cairo: Reading Between the Lines”, Muqarnas 13 (1996), 69).
34. For amiral awqaf in Ajlun, see Yusuf Ghawanmeh, “al-Tijarah ﬁ al-Urdunn ﬁ al-‘Asr al-Mamluki”, Studies in the 
History and Archaeology of Jordan 3 (1987): 323-330.
35. There appears to be no reference to Amman or any of its lands in Sarghatmish’s waqﬁyah of 757/1356 (Waqﬁyah 
3195, Wizarat al-Awqaf, Cairo) for this madrasa in Rumayla. The document has been partially published by ‘Abd al-
Latif Ibrahim in his “Nassan Jadidan min Wathiqat al-Amir Sarghatmish”, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University 
of Cairo 27 (1965): 121-158. 
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as well as a large number of the residents of the village, and invested in new constructions, 
making Amman the new district capital.36  In the following forty years, Amman passed from 
Sarghatmish to his oխcer Amir Bulut and subsequently parts of its land to Sultan Barquq’s 
Viceroy, amir Sudun al-Shaykhuni, who ﬁnancially invested in it. In 797 Amman was sold 
by Amir Bulut’s heirs to the Governor of Syria.37 Hisban, in the meantime, experienced a bit 
of a renaissance with som resettlement of the town an reuse of the citadel. Endowments of 
this sort may have played a special role in the administrative structure of Mamluk Jordan, 
as amiral and sultanic sponsorship of local centers molded the economic and political 
fortunes of places and peoples.38
POPULAR RESPONSES
Few villages or towns were impacted as directly as Hisban as a result of sales of Treasury 
land: Hisban seems to be an isolated incident of forced population transfer. In most villages, 
regardless of their status as an iqta‘, milk, or waqf, the management of farmland was largely 
in local hands; only on the most prosperous rural endowments were state oխcials more 
actively involved in the aﬀairs of the estate and local society. The responses of local peoples 
to the endowment of state lands in their region, and other government initiatives in the 
countryside, are reﬂected in the actions of peasants and commentaries on state initiatives 
by that segment of local society that gave them voice in the contemporary sources: the 
local intelligentsia.
Peasants and the local historians 
The political perspectives of peasants are not easily reconstructed from the kinds of 
written sources available. Outside of the legal depositions and court records preserved in 
the fourteenth-century Haram al Sharif collection in Jerusalem,39 we have yet to identify 
for the Mamluk period the numerous formal petitions to the Shari‘a courts available for 
Ottoman Jerusalem or correspondences with oխcials that can be found for the early-mid 
twentieth century.40 However, some sense of their attitudes towards the state, particularly 
36.  Archaeological excavations at Hisban have revealed the abandonment of the citadel in the mid fourteenth 
century. Initial analysis of the remains of the “governor’s palace” indicate that it was quickly abandoned after an 
earthquake (Bethany J. Walker and Øystein S. LaBianca, “The Islamic Qusur of Tall Hisban: Preliminary Report on the 
1998 and 2001 Seasons”, Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan 47 (2003): 443-471.
37.  Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Tarikh, 1:550.  
38.  On this theme, see Bethany J. Walker, “Mamluk Investment in Southern Bilad al-Sham in the Eighth/Fourteenth 
Century: The Case of Hisban”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 62.4 (2003): 241-261. 
39. For the contents of these documents, which arealso preserved on microﬁlm in the Bilad al-Sham Center of the 
University of Jordan, see Donald P. Little’s A Catalogue of the Islamic Documents form al-Haram as-Sarif in Jerusalem 
(Beirut, 1984). 
40. Amy Singer, in her Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Oﬃcials: Rural administration around sixteenth-Century 
Jerusalem (Cambridge, 1994), makes eﬀective use of the former for early Ottoman Palestine. For examples of the 
latter – letters to the Ministry of Endowments of Jordan - see Bethany J. Walker, Ellen Kenney, Laura Holzweg, 
Lynda Carroll, Stéphanie Boulogne, and Bernhard Lucke, “Village Life in Mamluk and Ottoman Hubras and Saham: 
Northern Jordan Project, Report on the 2006 Season”, Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan 52 (2007), 433, 
446.
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in aﬀairs relating to natural resources, can be gauged by their political activism (in its 
myriad forms) and critiques of state action, as described and transmitted by local historians. 
Syrian chroniclers, many of whom maintained personal and professional networks in the 
communities they describe, speak, in this sense, on behalf of the peoples of rural Bilad al-
Sham.
According to these historians, the practices of the Mamluk state that drew the 
strongest reactions from the countryside were interference of oխcials in traditional land 
management, hoarding or conﬁscation of grains, and ineﬀective crisis management. Water 
sharing, crop rotation, and the process of land preparation and harvest were generally 
guided by local custom; the state rarely intervened in any of these activities. When it did, 
local response could be remarkably swift and eﬀective. One particularly vivid example of 
conﬂict between a state oխcial and Jordanian peasants, in this regard, is related by Ibn Qadi 
Shuhba in his annal of 799/1396.41 Iyas al-Jarkashi, while Supervisor of the Jordan Valley 
(mushadd al-Aghwar) under Sultan Barquq, infuriated local farmers by diverting shared 
water to his own plantations in the region, forcing sales of his own sugar at inﬂated prices 
(tarh) on local residents, and terrorizing the population at large by cutting the hands oﬀ 
accused thieves. After numerous complaints by local peasants and administrators alike for 
his abuses, the sultan had him arrested and killed that year. When the actions of oխcials 
or the military led to general suﬀering, in the form of famine or widespread destruction 
of property, rural communities were capable of much more than ﬁling complaints. Syrian 
historians with a knowledge of, and personal concern for, Jordanian villages (such as Ibn 
Qadi Shuhba, Ibn Sasra, and Ibn Hijji) describe peasants taking up arms or abandoning their 
homes and farms when their food, animals and supplies were conﬁscated or collective 
punishment was inﬂicted upon them during the political unrest of the early ﬁfteenth 
century. 42 
Interference in resource management, theft, and violence by state oխcials immediately 
created tensions with rural communities. Most ﬁnancial practices, however, would have 
been largely invisible to local people, such as the inner workings of the Mamluk Treasury 
and the endowment system. There is nothing in written sources to suggest that peasants 
or pastoralists were aware of the changes of the day in state land management. While 
sultanic and amiral endowments undoubtedly did public good – even al-Maqrizi credited 
Sultan Barquq’s endowments with preventing widespread famine by feeding people – most 
of the large, endowed institutions (madrasas, hostels) were located in big towns outside of 
Jordan.43 As for the land that supported them, revenues were collected in essentially the 
same manner as before endowment; peasants’ lives continued as they always had. It should 
be emphasized that only the creation of large estates dedicated to cash crops, as in the case 
of Iyas al-Jarkashi, caused potential conﬂict. Accumulation of vast expanses of agricultural 
41. Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Tarikh, 1: 630-631.
42.  Bethany J. Walker, “The Role of Agriculture in Mamluk-Jordanian Power Relations”, in Exercising Power in 
the Age of the Sultanates: Bilad al-Sham and Iran, ed. B.J. Walker and Jean-François Salles, Bulletin d’Études Orientales, 
supplement 67 (2007): 77-96 ; Shawkat Ramadan Hijjah, al-Tarikh al-Siyasi li-Mintaqat Sharq al-Urdunn (min Junub al-
Sham) ﬁ ‘Asr Dawlat al-Mamalik al-Thaniyah (Irbid, 2002), 128-136.
43.  Allouche, Mamluk Economics, 53.
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land would have led to more centralized management and brought the state into more 
active engagement with local communities, although this is an area of inquiry that needs 
to be more fully explored.
On the other hand, how the state handled environmental, demographic, or economic 
crises (caused by drought, ﬂood, disease, or military incursions by foreign forces, for 
example), and the oppression and corruption of oխcials were issues of greater concern 
in the larger towns of Syria. For Damascus-based scholars with ties to the Jordanian 
countryside, like Ibn Hijji, misappropriation of waqf funds were signs of the corruption 
of their time. Ibn Hijji cites the buying and selling of endowment assets, the diversion 
of their revenues from legal beneﬁciaries, and the use of endowed buildings as personal 
domiciles or renting them out for personal proﬁt as proof of the degree to which the awqaf 
system had gone into decline.44 Mismanagement of this kind had direct ﬁnancial and social 
consequences in cities like Damascus.
Urban oխcials were not the only ones to take advantage of the emerging opportunities 
oﬀered by a growing waqf market. The most tangible response of local society to the 
increasing availability of formerly public lands was their purchase by members of the rural 
elite – local merchants, oխcials, and tribal leaders – and their subsequent endowment. 
The written sources that document a rise in rural endowments in Jordan among sultans 
and amirs in this period also attest to the development of private property among 
enterprising, and more aծuent, members of local communities. Mamluk-era waqﬁyat 
specify those properties, the revenues of which must be excluded from the endowment of 
lands for which the document was written, such as preexisting awqaf, both charitable and 
for families (mentioned in the documents by the family names), that are located within the 
borders of the estate described therein.45 For these preexisting endowments to have been 
made legally, they must have originally been the private property of the waqif.
There is supplementary documentary evidence for the growth in privately-owned, 
rural property in the late Mamluk period. Private land is referred to as such (milk) in the 
sixteenth-century tax registers described earlier. For Jordan, these are largely located in the 
region of Kerak, a phenomenon that still eludes explanation. The properties thus described 
are never very large: small plots of land (mazra‘as, qit‘as) or shares in farmland, gardens, 
orchards, mills, houses, and shops. Some of the register entries document with certitude the 
status of these properties as privately held, potentially gaining for them tax-exemption, by 
including the date of “certiﬁcation” (musadaqah) or “purchase” (tarikh al- mushtari). 46 Most 
purchases were certiﬁed during the late ﬁfteenth and early sixteenth century, thus at the 
44.  Yusuf Ghawanmeh, Dimashq, 111-116.
45.  These properties, thus identiﬁed, are concentrated on the Kerak Plateau: for example, Waqﬁyah #49, microﬁlm 
#15, folia 1-4, Dar al-Watha’iq, Cairo (mid-ﬁfteenth century – for Sultan Khushqadam’s Cairo madrasa); Waqﬁyah 
#40, microﬁlm #15, folia 1-3, Dar al-Watha’iq, Cairo (dated 762/1361 – for Sultan Hasan’s monumental madrasa 
complex in Cairo); and Waqﬁyah 704, Wizarat al-Awqaf, Cairo (dated 14 Sha‘ban 792/1390 for Barquq’s mosque-
madrasa complex in Cairo).
46.  al-Bakhit and Hmoud, Tapu Defteri 185, 334-337. Taxable revenues for these milk lands are not included in 
the registers, suggesting they were exempt from at least kharaj. For the legal debates in early Ottoman Egypt on 
tax exemption of lands purchased from the Treasury, see Kenneth Cuno, “Miri or Milk?”,122 and the section that 
follows.
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end of Mamluk rule. These entries reﬂect the requirement by Ottoman oխcials that tax-
payers provide documentation of ownership, such as a purchase document, a requirement 
with which few could comply.47 We cannot know, though, whether these properties were 
purchased directly from the Treasury, although that is likely.
The registers, moreover, list numerous, though relatively modest, charitable 
endowments (for local mosques, shrines, and ribats), suggesting that much of the land 
acquired by local oխcials and families in the last century of Mamluk rule was converted 
into waqf. Although taxed by the Ottoman state (at the rate of ‘ushr, rather than kharaj), it 
appears, at least for a while, that some of the endowments in Jordan were honored by the 
Ottoman government and remained in local hands, escaping conﬁscation. In short, once 
the opportunity to do so was recognized, the local elites took full advantage of the poor 
state of the Mamluk Treasury to acquire land for themselves and safeguard it through 
endowment.
The legal establishment
Kenneth Cuno describes the endowment of Treasury land as “an important factor 
in the economic and social life of the Islamic Middle East”, and certainly the degree to 
which the alienation of public lands dominated debates by the legal scholars of the day 
indicates the importance of this phenomenon on many levels.48 The context of the debates 
centered on the disappearance of small, peasant holdings since the early Islamic period 
and their eventual replacement with large estates, under nominal state control, a process 
described by Johansen as the “sultanization of the awqaf”.49 By the end of the Mamluk 
period, an alarmingly large portion of Treasury land had become privately owned through 
the transformation of iqta‘at into milk, the purchase of land or tax rights from the Treasury, 
and the giving away of state lands by the sultan to others as milk.50 Two Sunni madhhabs in 
particular, the Shaﬁ‘i and Hanaﬁ, questioned whether such practices were in the interest 
of their communities or legal at all. Such debates were not mere intellectualisms; they 
transformed the legal orientations of their respective schools and helped to mold public 
opinion about the role of the state in the rural sector and the nature of its relationships 
with peasants, in particular, and the land.
What was at stake here was not control over public lands: this was the clearly the 
prerogative of the sultan and supported by most lawyers. Technically, “ownership” and 
47.  Baber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants’ Loss of Property Rights as Interpreted in the 
Hanaﬁte Legal Literature of the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods (London, 1988), 81-82, 87-88; Cuno, “Was the Land of 
Ottoman Syria Miri or Milk?, 127-128.
48.  Cuno, “Ideological and Juridical Discourse”, 146. The following pulls on arguments made in ibid; Johansen, 
Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent; Cuno, “Miri or Milk?”; Martha Mundy, “ownership or oխce? A debate in Islamic 
Hanaﬁte jurisprudence over the nature of the military ‘ﬁef ’, from the Mamluks to the Ottomans”, in Law, Anthro-
pology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy (Cambridge, 
2004), 142-165; and Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez Smith, Governing Property, Making the Modern State: Law, 
Administration and Production in Ottoman Syria (London, 2007), 11-20.
49.  Johansen, Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent, 82.
50.  Ibid., 81.
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usufruct of agricultural land were subject to law, but how that law functioned was a matter 
of negotiation between proprietors (muqta‘s and their agents), waqf administrators, and 
peasants. These relationships are described in some detail in Egyptian and Syrian fatwas 
of the ﬁfteenth through eighteenth centuries. They are very useful, in this regard, for 
documenting legal developments (and political-economic realities) and changes in the 
fortunes of peasants, as well as measuring the pulse of public opinion as expressed by the 
ulama. In the late Mamluk and Ottoman periods this socio-economic class had become a 
body of “rentiers” who occupied a special position in the Mamluk state apparatus, rooted 
in both the cities and countryside. As recipients of stipends from endowed institutions, 
they had much to lose from attempts by the Ottoman government to incorporate awqaf 
assets back into the Treasury after the conquest of Egypt and Syria. Much of the debate 
in sixteenth-century fatwas about the legality of sultanic awqaf supports the claims of this 
class to former Treasury revenues.
In the late Mamluk period, debates centered on the general legality of alienating 
public (Treasury) lands through sale and endowment. Fatwas of this period focused on the 
conditions and under what circumstances such action was in the best interest of the Muslim 
community, through funding religious or public works or responding to emergencies. 
Ottoman fatwas on the same topic were more concerned with issues of taxation - whether 
it was legal for the state to tax (or conﬁscate) endowments made from former Treasury 
lands – having reached a general consensus at that point that the endowments in question 
were, in fact, legal. Diﬀerent opinions by Shaﬁ‘i and Hanaﬁ muftis on both issues reﬂect 
basic diﬀerences in the way they traditionally understood land tenure.
The Shaﬁ‘i was the highest ranking madhhab of the Mamluk state. While the Mamluks 
did appoint four chief judges from each of the Sunni schools, only the chief qadi of the Shaﬁ‘i 
school had the right to appoint deputy judges in the provinces, supervise the properties 
of orphans, and, most importantly, oversee the management of endowments. In this latter 
capacity, and as the privileged school in the Mamluk state, it had to rule on the legality 
of endowments made from Treasury lands.51 The majority of the populations of Syria and 
Egypt belonged to this school. Most of the Mamluk elite, however, ascribed to the Hanaﬁ 
school, which later became the oխcial madhhab of the Ottoman state.
The two schools originally diﬀered in their opinions about Treasury assets because of 
fundamental diﬀerences in how they understood the “ownership” of Egyptian and Syrian 
land. For the Hanaﬁs, Egypt and Syria, like Iraq, had been conquered by Muslim forces in 
the seventh century (taken by force and not treaty), and were thus subject to the kharaj 
tax. Nonetheless, the land remained in the hands of the previous owners: as long as taxes 
were paid, private ownership was honored, and the land could be sold and bequeathed by 
the proprietors at will. In short, the classical Hanaﬁ view supported private ownership of 
land from the start. The Shaﬁ‘is, by comparison, claimed conquered land automatically fell 
to the Treasury, and was administered by the ruler on behalf of the Muslim community as 
a whole. All agricultural land thus acquired the status of a collective waqf for all Muslims. 
51. Cuno, “Ideology and Juridical Discourse”, 148.
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In classical Shaﬁ‘i thought, the state “owned” all land (the revenues of which resided in 
the Bayt al-Mal), and so long as the ruler acted in the best interest of Muslims, he could sell 
Treasury assets. Moreover, any endowments made from such land that was purchased from 
the Treasury through “traditional” channels were fully legal. Shaﬁ‘i doctrine, in this sense, 
fully served the interests of the Mamluk state. For Hanaﬁ’s, land was in private ownership 
and only entered the Treasury if it was “sequestered” by the state (creating the category 
of aradi al-hawz), when the owners failed to pay their taxes or abandoned their ﬁelds, or 
when the owners died without heirs. Only in the latter case would land permanently enter 
the Treasury, and the ruler could sell it from there when it was needed. In order to explain 
how land that was once privately owned by peasants came under the complete control 
of the state, the Hanaﬁs developed the concept of the “death of the proprietors”, which 
maintained the ﬁction that at some point all land owners in Egypt had died intestate, and 
that the state had acquired legal rights over their properties as a result. As the owners of 
such land, the state (or the ruler as the agent of the state) had the right to sell and endow its 
own assets. Thus, over the course of the late Mamluk period Hanaﬁ opinion gradually came 
to conform to that of the Shaﬁ‘is in regards to the legality of the alienation of public lands. 
Both, however, agreed that assets were best retained in the Treasury and that only when in 
the best interest (maslaha) of Muslims could they be sold, awarded in grants, or endowed.52 
Not all lawyers, however, supported such conclusions, considering them mere 
acknowledgements of the status quo. Some contemporaries challenged the collective 
wisdom of the legal establishment on the basis that many practices connected to the 
Treasury harmed the state and did not serve the best interests of Muslims. One of the 
most vocal critics of management of the Treasury by the later Mamluk and early Ottoman 
sultans was the Shaﬁ‘i scholar Taqi al-Din Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-
Balatunusi (lived 851-936/1448-1529), whose Tahrir al-Maqal ﬁ-ma yahrim min Bayt al-Mal, a 
collection of fatwas completed in 871 H, provides a Syrian perspective on corruption and 
illegalities in the ﬁnancial sphere, much like al-Asadi’s work.53 This treatise is important 
on many levels. Chronologically, it spans the late Mamluk and early Ottoman transition, 
critiquing practices that were developing over the course of the early sixteenth century. 
Intellectually, it owes much to a network of Syrian scholars who lived in Damascus but had 
family roots in Jordan and maintained professional ties there. 
The details of these networks are beyond the scope of this paper, and are explored 
elsewhere.54 Nonetheless, they do reﬂect a heritage born of rural roots, with an interest in, 
and knowledge about, the resources and peoples of the countryside, and are thus relevant 
to this study.55 Al-Balatunusi was a Shaﬁ‘i scholar in Damascus, who was inﬂuenced by 
52.  Joseph H. Escovitz, “The Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in the Mamluk Empire”, Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 102.3 (1982): 529-531; Cuno, “Miri or Milk?”, 123-125; and idem, “Ideology and Juridical Discourse”, 
147-149.
53. I refer hereafter to Fath-Allah Muhammad Ghazi al-Sabbagh’s edition of this work (1989, Cairo).
54.  Walker, Jordan in the Late Middle Ages, in chapters 1 and 4.
55.  Compared to the Hanaﬁ scholars of Ottoman Egypt and Syria examined by Cuno and Mundy in the articles 
cited previously, these lawyers seem to have less a vested interest in maintaining endowments from Treasury lands 
for their own salaries.
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the work of Ibn Qadi Shuhba (d. 851/1448), Chief Qadi of Damascus in the 1430s.56 As a 
younger man, al-Balatunusi studied under two Damascus-born scholars who traced their 
family to a center of jurisprudence in Jordan: Taqi al-Din ibn Qadi Ajlun (d. 928 H) and 
Najm al-Din ibn Qadi Ajlun (d. 876 H). Among his own students were those whose family 
origins were also in Ajlun, as well as the small town of Salt, in central Jordan.57 As many 
of his colleagues claimed a Jordanian background (though going back a few generations), 
so did his academic genealogy. Ibn Qadi Shuhba was a student of the Ibn Hijji al-Husbani 
(d. 816 H) mentioned earlier.58 Although a Shaﬁ‘i lawyer in Damascus, and born into a 
family of lawyers like Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Ibn Hijji apparently still had relatives in Jordan and 
maintained closer ties with Jordanian villages than even his nisba (“from Hisban”) would 
suggest. He regularly visited villages in northern and central Jordan and corresponded 
on a regular basis with local scholars; his chronicle pulls heavily from these letters and 
demonstrates a real compassion for the suﬀering of the people living there. Tahrir al-Maqal, 
likewise, is ultimately concerned with justice for the rural and urban poor and communal 
access to land. Land is a precious resource, and its revenues belong to all Muslims.  
Al-Balatunusi wrote his treatise, on the one hand, to chastise his colleagues in the 
legal profession, and on the other, to encourage them to discover how such practices got 
out of control, in an eﬀort to address them.59 He repeatedly refers to the alienation of 
public lands as bid‘a (illegal innovation) and fasad (immorality or corruption); the work 
essentially concludes that, in contrast to the general consensus of his contemporaries, 
the sale of Treasury land was illegal. He rejects the reasons used by imams (sultans) for 
dipping into the Treasury.60 Treasury lands, in al-Balatunusi’s mind, cannot be sold for 
emergencies, such as a drought, famine, or military campaign: it is better to establish a 
legal waqf that will serve these purposes in perpetuity. It cannot be sold to respond to 
unexpected circumstances, such as the sudden need to build mosques, canals, dams, and 
bridges at a time when the Treasury is low or empty: in such cases assets can be merely 
borrowed, temporarily, from the Treasury and must be returned when the crisis passes.61 
Financial exigencies should never be met by using up Treasury funds.
He further argues that the Treasury is a sacred trust for the beneﬁt of the Muslim 
community as a whole (masalih al-muslimin, li-maslahah ‘amah) and belongs to no single 
individual, whether a sultan, amir, or civilian oխcial. Sales and endowments made from 
it were a form of theft from the public. He bemoans the fact that soldiers came to think 
of their iqta‘s and the rulers of the Treasury as their private property, which they could 
56.  Joseph Schacht, “Ibn Kadi Shuhba”, Encyclopaedia of Islam 4 (1971): 814.
57.  Tahrir al-Maqal, 48-54.
58.  His full name is Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad ibn Hijji al-Sa‘idi al-Husbani al-Dimashqi. For his biography, see Tarikh 
Ibn Hijji, ed. Abu Yahya ‘Abdallah al-Kandari (Beirut, 2003), 11-16 and Sami G. Massoud, An Analysis of the Annalistic 
Sources for the Early Mamluk Circassian Period, Vol. One, Ph.D. diss., McGill University (Montreal, 2005), 179-180. the 
latter has recently been published as The Chronicles and Annalistic Sources of the Early Mamluk Circassian Periode (Leiden, 
2007).
59.  Tahrir al-Maqal, 87.
60.  Ibid., 242.
61.  “wa al-istaqrad ila an yahsulu ﬁ Bayt al-Mal fa la yajuzu al-bay‘” (Ibid., 240-241).
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bequeath; the injustice of the political leadership, the corruption of the ulama, and the 
general ignorance of the population led to this state of aﬀairs. According to al-Balatunusi, 
everyone wanted a piece of the Treasury for himself:
“And everyone rushed to claim what they could from the Treasury and other places. People 
struggled and competed ever more in this until the Treasury was transformed into private 
property, endowments, and income (rizq). These, in turn, were transformed, by trickery, into 
personal estates that could be passed down to their families”.62 
For al-Balatunusi, the issue was less about the act of endowment than about who 
beneﬁted from it. He speciﬁcally condemns those practices that allow individuals not 
entitled to Treasury funds to collect revenues from endowments made from Treasury assets. 
The poor should be the ultimate recipients, as they were legally entitled (mustahiqqun bi 
al-shar‘) to kharaj revenues. If endowed from the Treasury, family awqaf were illegal, as were 
those for Suﬁ institutions (funding shrines was batal) and endowments that served special 
groups, other than the ulama. Conﬁrming his Shaﬁ‘i heritage on this point, he emphasizes 
throughout his work that Treasury assets are a kind of waqf for all Muslims. 
There were, as well, Hanaﬁ voices that expressed concern about the privatization of 
public resources. Hanaﬁs’ opinions about land ownership changed signiﬁcantly over the 
course of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, during which time they gradually 
abandoned their traditional support for small-scale, private ownership. The most inﬂuential 
work in this regard, Ibn al-Humam’s Sharh fath al-qadir li-l-‘ajiz al-faqir, while later cited 
as justiﬁcation for these changing views, actually condemns both state monopolies over 
land and the alienation of the same from the Treasury.63 Kamal al-Din Muhammad ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahid ibn al-Humam (1388-1457) was the ﬁrst scholar of his madhhab to articulate a 
doctrine of land ownership based on the concept of the “death of the kharaj-payer”, which 
he adopted to explain to himself the disappearance of peasant land ownership rights and 
the appearance of large landed estates. According to Ibn al-Humam, the land of Egypt used 
to be kharaj-paying, thus, privately-owned. This was no longer the case, however, in his 
day, leading him to suggest that it was as if all the land owners (kharaj-payers) had died 
intestate, leaving their property to the state.64 The concept was a valid one legally and 
made sense, in a limited sense, historically, considering the fate of the properties of victims 
of the Black Death. As a recognized legal category, land that fell to the Treasury in the 
absence of legal heirs could be sold by the state to new owners. The idea that all kharaj 
tax-payers had died without heirs was taken literally by subsequent generations of Hanaﬁ 
scholars and adopted by them to justify state control of nearly all land under the Mamluks, 
as well as the alienation by the same from the Treasury.65
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It is clear that he did not approve of the latter practice, claiming that Treasury assets 
were a sacred charge and should be treated carefully by the ruler:
“It is not permissible for the Imam to buy or sell anything from the Treasury, because 
responsibility for caring for Muslims’ money is like the responsibility of an orphan’s guardian. 
He is not allowed to sell from [his ward’s] property, except in times of greatest need and there 
being no other way to support him.”
As for the practice of a sultan buying Treasury land, he only reluctantly concedes, as in 
the case of orphans, only on the condition that there is demonstrable need for the sale to 
support the Muslim community.66 For Ibn al-Humam, like al-Balatunusi, Muslims’ interests 
were best served by keeping assets in the Treasury.
CONCLUSIONS 
We cannot know what long-term results these practices would have ultimately 
produced, as the Ottoman conquest interrupted the process of privatization, accelerated 
by the last Mamluk sultans. However, their potential is indicated by the early Ottoman 
tax registers, which document the continued productivity through the sixteenth century 
of estates in Jordan endowed from Treasury lands during the fourteenth.67 Through the 
Ottomans’ investment in and providing security for them, former Mamluk endowments, 
at least for a time, were lucrative, taxable assets, whether as governorial khass or amiral 
timars. Perhaps these larger landed estates – contiguous plots of land under a single 
proprietor – could be more eխciently managed and taxed, and at less operating expense, 
than dispersed iqta‘at or small, privately-owned gardens and shares of land.68 Regardless, 
the Ottomans maintained the largest of the rural endowments in Jordan for the simple 
reason that they guaranteed considerable tax revenues.
It remains to be seen how characteristic of Bilad al-Sham as a whole the changes in 
land proprietorship identiﬁed in Jordan were. One should see similar patterns in the rest 
of Syria. The reasons for such an early and extensive transformation of state lands to awqaf 
in the Transjordan still remain to be explained, although the arguably greater availability 
of land following the Black Death and the demonstrated ﬂuidity of the local administrative 
structure may have made the process here easier than anywhere else. As for the local 
dimension of agrarian change, much is to be learned about peasants’ responses to the land 
reforms of the Tanzimat era. The application of the 1858 Land Law requiring registration of 
land, for tax purposes, facilitated the creation of large, privately owned landed estates. The 
nineteenth-century grain boom in southern Syria would not have been possible without 
this development.69 Jordanians in the ﬁfteenth century, like those in the nineteenth, 
made calculated decisions about land with an eye to both tradition and proﬁtability. They 
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took full advantage of opportunities to regain control over it, in both management and 
proprietorship, when state monopolies over “public” lands waned. The alienation of state 
lands in the late Mamluk period, while it was devastating to the Treasury, was proﬁtable to 
many segments of Syrian society. 
